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BOOK REVIEW
Psychoanalysis and the Law. C. G. SCHOENFELD. Springfield, Il-
linois: Charles C. Thomas. 1973. Pp. ix, 285. $13.75.
Entitling a book Psychoanalysis and the Law ought to inspire the
kind of interest among lawyers and law schools that Everything You
Have Always Wanted To Know About Sex1 created among the general
public. For psychiatry and psychoanalysis have finally "arrived" on
the legal stage. No less than two hundred professors are listed in
this field in the current AALS Directory of Law Teachers.2 Any
month's Index to Legal Periodicals will show several articles of general
review on "Psychiatry and the Law," 3 and recently an extensive
symposium was conducted on this topic.4 Indeed, many of the
major law schools have psychiatrists on their staffs and offer
courses in law and psychiatry. 5 We have come a long way since
lawyers turned a closed, if not deaf, ear to the introduction of
psychiatry into the law schools by Andrew Watson in the 1950's.6
Now appears C. G. Schoenfeld's book, Psychoanalysis and the
Law. This volume is actually two books and must be so reviewed.
Part I deals with "[b]asic psychoanalytic tenets and the law"--the
old bones that have been worried over so many times: the uncon-
scious, motivation, the superego, symbolism, and aggression. It is to
be commended, however, for not wasting time rehashing the
M'Naghten and Durham rules.7 Part II contains a totally new ap-
proach entitled "Psychoanalysis and Constitutional Law." Many
I D. RUEBEN, EVERYTHING YOU HAVE ALWAYS WANTED To KNOW ABOUT SEX BUT WERE
AFRAID To ASK (1969).
2 ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS: DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1973.
' See Turner, Psychiatry and the Law, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 157 (1973). See also
Bartholomew, Some Problems of the Psychiatrist in Relation to Sentencing, 15 CuM. L.Q. 325
(1973); Fried, Psychiatric Consultation and Adult Probation Case Management, 37 FED. PROBATION
12 (1973); Leroy, Avoiding Psychiatric Malpractice, 9 CAL. W. L. REv. 260 (1973); Wexler,
Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1972).
4 S)nposium-Law and Psychiaty, 10 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 33 (1972). See also S)ymposium
-Mental Illness, the Law and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 367 (1973).
5 Law schools having psychiatrists on their teaching staffs include Columbia University
Law School, Harvard University Law School, University of California Law School, Berkeley,
and University of Michigan Law School.
6 A. Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers, 1957 (Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School mimeo);
Watson, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of Pennsylvania: A Psychiatrist on
the Law Faculty, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 73 (1958).




lawyers may have harbored thoughts that Supreme Court Justices
have made decisions from the couch or on the basis of unconscious
predilections. But that is not where this book is headed. It seriously
tries to examine four constitutional problems from a psychoanalytic
point of view: judicial review of congressional enactments, judicial
activism and judicial self-restraint, literal interpretation of the
Constitution, and balancing federal and state powers.
This review will select "motivation" from Part I and 'Judicial
review" from Part Ii for detailed analysis. Only minor reference
will be made to other concepts and sections.
PART I: BASIC PSYCHOANALYTIC TENETS AND THE LAW
Chapter 2 in Part I of Schoenfeld's work is entitled "Uncon-
scious Motives and the Law." One might expect to find here a
discussion of the fascinating and rapidly developing psychological
studies of motivation in criminal behavior. Not so. There is not so
much as a clear definition of "motive."' 8 The book turns out to be
Neo-Freudian in approach, 9 and is more concerned with uncon-
scious motives in judges' decisions and reactions of litigants to
judges than with the psychology of motivation in criminal or other
acts with which the law deals. 10
The most elemefitary psychology textbooks today would not so
limit a chapter on motives." Current motivational theory em-
phasizes "drives" such as exploration, curiosity, achievement, and
values. t 2 Regrettably, Schoenfeld fails to recognize that the old "id"
drives of Freud are inadequate explanations. Even this reviewer, as
A generally acceptable modern definition of motive might be: "The capacity
to habitually gain gratification from a particular class of incentives."
9 Schoenfeld summarizes why lawyers should pay particular attention to psychoanalytic
psychology by quoting John Dollard's observation, "Let's face it, Freud has won." P. 5. He
also echoes Edward S. Robinson's view that a lawyer is "likely to conclude that of all
contemporary psychologists, the Freudian is the one whose interests are most nearly
identical with his own." Id.
10 Very early the author makes dear his view that
trials offer many opportunities for unconscious ideas and reactions to find expres-
sion .... Thus the reverential awe exhibited by some persons toward judges-and
conversely the angry defiance displayed towards judges by others-may well reflect
the influence of parent-oriented feelings.
Pp. 16-17.
" See, e.g., PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1972).
12 See J. ATKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MOTIVATION (1964); J. ATKINSON, A THEORY
OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION (1966); D. BERLYNE, CONFLICT AROUSAL AND CURIOSITY
(1960); A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954); D. MCCLELLAND, THE
ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE (1953); White, Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence, 66
PSYCH. REV. 297 (1959).
1178 [Vol. 59:1177
BOOK REVIEW
early as 1963, summarized these modern emphases and charted
several additions to personality and motivation theory.' 3 Numerous
scholars, both Freudian and non-Freudian, have carried this dis-
cussion of motive far beyond Freud's concepts. 14 Yet Schoenfeld
fails to deal with these significant developments.'
5
Certainly psychoanalytic psychology has a great deal to teach
lawyers about motivation, and we would do well to reshape our
thinking on criminality, prisons, rehabilitation, drug abuse, and so
forth accordingly. But this is not accomplished by merely pointing
out to lawyers that all of us make decisions based on unconscious
preconceptions and motives. Law must deal with motivation and
personality factors because it deals with people. Therefore, we
need further guidance on how to manipulate and change these
factors which influence people to create the kinds of relationships
and societal patterns which law is commissioned to produce.
Chapter IV on symbolism has similar inadequacies. Even
Freudianism has much to say about symbolism. But Mr. Schoenfeld
devotes a large part of this chapter to the law and judges as
symbolic of the parent figure. Certainly law has used language
suggesting that guardians, trustees, or even judges may be substi-
tuted for parents. Nevertheless, the law is moving away from the
doctrine of in loco parentis in many fields, and the book fails to
analyze this important trend within the framework of its discussion
of symbolism.'
6
Although the lawyer will find Part I interesting and stimulating
reading, it does not provide an instructive lesson in what he needs
to know about psychoanalysis.
PART II: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The most interesting of Schoenfeld's theories in Part II is his
psychoanalytical explanation of judicial review. He presents the two
principal-and to a certain extent, opposing-theories of judicial
review: (1) that it was intended by the Founding Fathers and (2)
that it was inevitable, whether or not it was intended. 17 He points
out that, although the Supreme Court claimed the power of judi-
13 H. FREEMAN, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 19-47 (1964).
14 See PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, supra note 10, at 414-15 (Table 21.2), 434-35 (Table 22.1).
,5 Id. chs. 21, 22, 23, 24, 26.
16 There are a number of recent books dealing with law and symbolism. See, e.g., W.
PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1973); W. BISHIN k C. STONE, LAW,




cial review in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison,'8 it was not until 1857
that the Court first exercised this power in the Dred Scott case. 19
And not until after the Civil War did the Court assume the role of
final arbiter of the Constitution that it plays today. Schoenfeld
suggests that there is a psychoanalytically understandable reason
for this shift by the Court from dormancy to activism:
If, as psychoanalysts have discovered, traumatic events tend
to stir up unconscious vestiges of the immature needs and desires
of childhood; and if, as suggested above, the Civil War was the
most traumatic event in American history, then the likelihood is
that the Civil War aroused in many people childhood urges ...
including the very strong wish of childhood for parental guid-
ance and control. If it is now recalled that judges and courts
frequently serve as unconscious parent symbols . . . then it is
conceivable that the unconscious wish for parental direction and
control presumably stirred up in many people by the Civil War
may have caused these people to be more willing than before to
accept . . . judicial review of congressional legislation.21
As a corollary to this theory, Schoenfeld views the power
struggle between the states and the federal government as a type of
Oedipal conflict wherein the states react to their loss of power with
the "anger, hostility and rage of childhood. ' '22 Labor relations and
labor law are also seen as reflecting Oedipal patterns.2 3
It would seem that Schoenfeld's four-page legal analysis in
support of his judicial review theory2 4 is less than adequate. He
only briefly discusses Marbury v. Madison2 5 and Dred Scott v.
Sanford,26 the Federalist Papers,27 and the views of constitutional
scholars Professors Rostow 28 and Corwin.2 9 His major reliance is on
practices in Switzerland, and in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.
's 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
19 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20 See C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 287-312 (1914).
21 P. 114. See also Schoenfeld, On the Relationship Between Law and Unconscious Symbolism,
26 LA. L. REv. 46 (1965).
22 P. 202.
23 P. 200. See also Morris, The Psychoanalysis of Labor Strikes, 10 LAB. L.J. 833 (1959).
24 pp. 108-11.
25 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
26 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
27 A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Mentor ed. 1961).
28 Schoenfeld discusses Rostow's belief that the courts have not overstepped their
authority in their review activities. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
29 See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1-2), 42
HARV. L. REv. 149, 265 (1928-1929). The author does refer to Corwin's tracing of judicial
review to common law principles.
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He uses these countries as examples to suggest that 'judicial review
of national legislation is by no means inevitable in a constitutional
democracy."3 0 In Switzerland, the national congress or a citizens'
referendum decides the constitutionality of a law. Similarly, in the
Scandinavian countries, the highest court does not exercise judicial
review as the United States Supreme Court does.3 1
The difficulty with Schoenfeld's analysis is that he fails to
consider the plain fact that ours is a government with a written
constitution and written laws, and that the courts are the recog-
nized interpreters of legal meaning. Judicial review is not as "new"
as Schoenfeld suggests; its roots lie deep in Anglo-American his-
tory. In Britain, although Parliament is supreme and there is no
written constitution, it is the function of the House of Lords, sitting
as a judicial body, to make the final decision on appeals. This
function was performed in the colonies, and later in the American
federation, by the courts.
But these objections aside, any reader should find the author's
theses fascinating. There is much in the application of
psychoanalysis to law from which lawyers can learn. The book is
therefore recommended, not as definitive, but as explorative and
unique.
Harrop A. Freeman
30 P. 110.
3 Pp. 109-10.
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